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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BARBARA JUNE FLANNERY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
- vs. -

Case No.
13896

JEROLD FRANK FLANNERY,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for divorce by the plaintiff against
the deefndant. The Plaintiff and Appellant herein appeals from an Order amending the Decree of Divorce
entered on October 21, 1974, in which the Court arbitrarily reduced the amount of support money, property
changes and amount of the delinquent alimony and
support money which had been entered on the 20th day
of November, 1974s?(Tr. 16).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court on the 20th of November, 1973
(Tr. 16), entered a Decree of Divorce dissolving the
bonds of matrimony and awarding to the plaintiff the
custody of the three minor children of the parties, subject to the defendant's right of visitation, and the sum
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of $900.00 per month alimony and support money for
the three minor children of the parties, and the Court
also by said Decree awarded to the plaintiff the equity
in the home located at 712 East 650 North, Bountiful,
Utah, together with the furniture, fixtures and appliances located therein; that plaintiff was awarded onehalf of the stocks, bonds, and savings accounts acquired
by the parties during the marriage. By said Decree, the
plaintiff was awarded the sum of $500 on account of
attorney's fees incurred by said plaintiff for the use and
benefit of her counsel in the prosecution of this action.
That on the 21st day of February, 1974, upon motion of the plaintiff (Tr. 20), the Court made and
entered its Order amending the Decree to conform with
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to include
an award to the plaintiff of the 1972 Pontiac Firebird
and Ordering same to be awarded to the plaintiff free
and clear of all encumbrances, the defendant to pay and
discharge any amounts due and owing on said automobile. The Amendment to the Decree as modified, recites
that the Divorce Decree remains in full force and effect
as to all other matters therein contained.
Thereafter, and on the 20th day of March, 1974,
at a time when the Decree had become absolute and
final, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause (Tr. 46)
why the Decree of Divorce should not be modified based
on oral statements of either the defendant or defendant's
counsl as to the defendant's inability to pay, due to
business reversals, alimony and support money as Ordered, and as to the property. Affidavits and Counter
Affidavits were filed, together with plaintiff's memoran-
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dum (Tr. 50). Defendant did not submit a memorandum, only affidavits. Plaintiff also in an attempt to settle
the matter of the ability of the defendant to pay the
amount of alimony and support money awarded to plaintiff, made a demand for production of the defendant's
1973 income tax return which was never granted. Plaintiff also in an attempt to settle with the defendant made
a proposed stipulation (Tr. 56) which was never accepted and agreed upon by the defendant.
After several months of delay, the Court called for
a hearing on the 8th day of August, 1974 (Tr. 74), at
which time the Court arbitrarily insisted on the parties
stipulating but terms were never made clear and the
Court nevertheless set forth certain provisions and modifications at that time. Thereafter, in a letter to Judge
Swan (Tr. 76), plaintiffs attorney called the Court's
attention that there was an arrearage of support money
in the amount of $2751.05, that there was also an income
tax refund amounting to $1695.05 which was then due
and owing under the Decree of November 20, 1973,
and which had never been modified. Plaintiff's counsel
in the letter pointed out to the Court that he was of the
opinion that the Court said $1600 was the arrears instead of $600 which the Order amending the Decree of
Divorue (Tr. 77) recites should be paid in the amount
of $25 per month with no interest. The Court also arbitrarily and with no reason at all reduced the award of
attorney's fees from $500 to $400 and gave to the defendant all of the stocks and bonds of the parties even though
Affidavits in evidence were submitted that the plaintiff
worked and helped the defendant in the operation of his
business and the acquiring of the stocks during the first
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part of their marriage. It is from the Order Amending
the Decree of Divorce dated October 21, 1974 (Tr. 73),
that the plaintiff appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant were intermarried on March
5, 1948; they were residents of Davis County, State of
Utah, and had been for more than three months preceding the filing of this action. There were born five
children as the issue of this marriage and at the time of
the filing of the divorce complaint there were three minor
children still residing with the plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged
in her Complaint that defendant earned in excess of
$26,000 per year as shown on his income tax return for
1972; at the time the Decree was entered he showed his
earnings to be in excess of this amount and based thereon
the Court awarded to her $900 per month alimony and
support money in the Decree of November 20, 1973
(Tr. 16). Prior thereto on August 14, 1973 an Order to
Show Cause was issued requiring the defendant to show
cause, if any he had, why he should not pay to plaintiff
temporary alimony and attorney's fees pending the disposition of this action on its merits (Tr. 4). Defendant
was personally served with this Order on the 15th day
of August, and when he failed to appear in accordance
with the Order on the 11th day of September, 1973, the
Court issued a bench warrant (Tr. 8). Thereafter, the
defendant appeared in the office of La Mar Duncan,
attorney for plaintiff, and agreed upon temporary alimony and support money in the sum of $900 per month
and asked that the Bench Warrant be recalled, which
Order was thereafter made (Tr. 6).
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Subsequently, when the defendant failed to Answer
the plaintiff's Complaint, summons having been served
on him on the 20th day of August, 1973, the plaintiff,
through her attorney caused a Notice of Hearing on
the Complaint on its merits to be mailed to defendant
at his business address (Tr. 11), which notice called to
the defendant's attention that he was in default and that
on the 20th of November, 1973, at 10:00 o'clock A.M.,
or as soon thereafter as the matter could be heard,
plaintiff would request a default judgment and would
ask the Court to hear her divorce action. Pursuant to
said notice and on the 20th day of November, 1973,
defendant being fully aware of the Complaint and the
contents thereof, the Decree of Divorce was duly entered.
Thereafter, the defendant did come to the office of the
plaintiff's attorney where he stated his business was poor
and was slacking off and he was unable to pay this
amount of support money and asked the plaintiff's attornay to compromise the Decree which had already
been settled; at that time plaintiff's attorney advised him
that he was not modifying the Decree, that it was based
on his income and alimony and support money was always subject to the review of the Court but that the
matter of the modification of the Decree would have to
be made within the three month period as required by
law (Tr. 32).
In the plaintiff's own Affidavit (Tr. 36) plaintiff
also made him aware of the conditions and provisions
of the Decree of Divorce and defendant sometime in
January, 1974, came to her and to the plaintiff's attorney
to get the matter reviewed and have the Decree modi-
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fied. Defendant's attorney then entered the case and
called plaintiff's attorney and asked that the matter be
reviewed and the plaintiff's attorney told Mr. Hatch that
the plaintiff refused any further negotiations and wanted
to stand on the Decree which had been heretofore made
and entered.
Later on April 29, 1974, long after the Decree had
become final, Mr. Hatch filed an affidavit setting out
certain facts, particularly that defendant's income had
been reduced. However, later at the time Judge Swan
saw fit to modify this Decree, the evidence showed that
the defendant was actually earning approximately
$10,000 more in the year 1973 than he did in 1972 when
he earned $26,000. Nevertheless, and without any reason
whatsoever, except the statement that defendant's business was slipping off, the Court reduced the amount in
accordance therewirth and modified the Decree as set
forth in the Amended Decree of October 21, 1974 (Tr.
75).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO
SET ASIDE THE DECREE AS TO MONEYS THAT
BECAME DUE AND OWING TO THE PLAINTIFF
FROM THE DEFENDANT UNDER THE DECREE
OF NOVEMBER 20, 1973.

In the case of Matthews vs. Matthews, the Court
per curiam said in 102 Utah 428, P. 434 (132 P.2d 111)
as follows:
"In his brief on appeal, appellant enumerates
several contentions but they are all resolved in
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the question of res adjudicata. . . . The judgment
of a court of concurrent jurisdiction, directly upon
the point, is as a plea, a bar, or as evidence, conclusive, between the same parties, upon the same
matter directly in question in another Court."
15 R.C.L. 951, Sec. 429.
"The foundation principle upon which the
doctrine of res ajudicata rests is that parties ought
not to be permitted to litigate the same issue
more than once; that, when a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court
of competent purisdiction, or an opportunity for
such trial has been given, the judgment of the
court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties, and those in privity
with them in law or estate. * * * Public policy
and the interest of litigants alike require that there
be an end to litigation, and the peace and order
of society demand that matters distinctly put in
issue and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction as to parties and subject matter shall
not be retried between the same parties in any
subsequent suit in any court." 15 R.C.L. 953,
Sec. 430.
In the case at bar the Defendant, as the record will
show, was first served with a Summons and Complaint
(Tr. 9) on the 20th of August, 1973. On that same day
he was also served with an Order to Show Cause (Tr. 4).
He failed to appear for the Order to Show Cause and
a Bench Warrant was issued. He also failed to answer
the Summons and Complaint. In order to be sure that
the defendant was further aware of the duty he had to
defend this action, the plaintiff, through her attorney,
caused to be mailed to the defendant a Notice of the
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date set for the default hearing in which the notice
recited that the plaintiff would proceed on the 20th day
of November 1973, at 10:00 a.m. to apply to the Court
for a default judgment and would ask the Court to
hear her divorce action on its merits (Tr. 11). This
notice was mailed to the office of the defendant and
was never returned. Subsequently, in January of 1974,
the defendant talked to the plaintiff about the Decree
and also to plaintiff's attorney, and even came to the
office of plainiff's attorney with his copy of the Decree
which was mailed to him after its entry. A copy of it
was also thereafter mailed to Mr. Orrin Hatch, who at
this late date entered his appearance. This was mailed
to Mr. Hatch in December, 1973, upon his request (Tr.
32, 33, 34). Also, see Affidavit of the plaintiff (Tr. 36),
and the affidavit of her attorney (Tr. 39). The defendant
was therefore fully aware of the terms and provisions of
the Decree of Divorce entered on November 20, 1973,
and when he failed and refused to answer during the interlocutory period, the matter became res ad judicata. We
call the Court's attention to Rule 60-B:
"The Motion be made within a reasonable time
and for reasons 1, 2, 3, and 4, not more than three
months after the judgment Order or proceeding
was entered or taken."
We are aware that the matter of alimony and support money may be modified upward or downward by
the Court with a change of circumstances and financial
conditions of the parties. However, plaintiff, after the
three months' period has elapsed, obtains an absolute
property right in the real and personal property.
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POINT II.
THAT THE COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO CHANGE ITS DECREE AS TO THE
REAL PROPERTY INVOLVED SINCE WHEN THE
DECREE BECAME ABSOLUTE AND FINAL, THE
INTEREST OF THE PARTIES VESTED IN THE
PLAINTIFF.

After the three-month interlocutory period had
elapsed, the Court was without jurisdiction to set aside
the Decree as to the award of real property. Under
Rule 60(b), defendant's only remedy would be an attempt to set aside the Decree and Judgment by a separate action upon the showing of fraud. With all the notice
and awareness that defendant and his attorney had
during the interlocutory period, it is inconceivable that
defendant could claim fraud. As to his affidavits which
are firmly disputed, we submit defendant or his attorney
had a duty to make some sort of motion to set aside or
modify the Decree rather than oral requests which plaintiff and her counsel both refused.
See Anderson vs. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277 (282
P.2d 845, 847) and Masters v. Le Seuer, 373 P.2d 573,
13 Utah 2d 293.
In Kettner vs. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382 (375 P.2d 28),
the court said:
"We are in accord with the proposition urged
by the defendant that the trial Court has broad
discretion in granting new trials, and in allowing
relief under Rule 60(b). But its power is not without limitation and cannot be exercised capriciously
or arbitrarily. It is elementary that under usual
circumstances the regular rules of procedure are
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binding, and that a party who has allowed the
time to move for a new trial to expire is thereafter precluded from doing so. This can be
avoided only where it is made to appear that for
one or more of the reasons specified in Rule 60(b)
justice has been so thwarted that equity and good
conscience demand that this extraordinary relief
be granted. And the burden of showing facts to
justify doing so is upon him who seeks such relief.
"In order to warrant the granting of a new
trial on the ground of belatedly discovered evidence, relied on by the plaintiffs, it would have
to appear both that it 'by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial'; and that such evidence was of sufficient substance that there would be a reasonable likelihood of a different result. Otherwise, it
is obvious that the ends of justice would not be
served by ordering a new trial.
"Sparing the detail of plaintiffs5 affidavits, it
is sufficient to say that any evidence referred to
therein having any probative value on the disputed issues appears to be so meager that we
cannot believe there is any likelihood that it would
produce a different result. But more significant,
and of controlling importance, is the fact that
no reason whatsoever is given to show why suuh
evidence could not have been discovered in time
to move for a new trial, nor in fact to have been
presented on the original trial. Therefore, there
existed no proper basis for granting relief under
Rule 60(b)."
In Board of Education of Granite School District
vs. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385 (384 P.2d 806), it is stated:
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"Where defendant in his reasons for setting
aside default judgment, asserted that the judgment interest was based upon a void contract
for the reason that the contract did not comply
with the statue of frauds, such assertion went to
the merit of he case and could not be considered
on motion to set aside judgment."
POINT III.
THE COURT BY ITS ORDER AMENDING THE
DECREE ARBITRARILY AND WITH NO REASON
WHATSOEVER, CHANGED THE DECREE OF NOVEMBER 20, 1973, EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT'S
INCOME HAD INCREASED.

All of the evidence pointed to the fact that defendant's salary had increased in the last year. Yet the
Court took it upon itself to modify the Decree and cut
the alimony and support money provision in half. There
was no justification for the change.
POINT IV.
THERE WAS NO CONSENT OR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHEREBY THE COURT
COULD CONSIDER THAT PLAINTIFF HAD
AGREED T O OR STIPULATED WITH DEFENDANT T O THE CHANGING OF THE ORIGINAL
DECREE.

There was no agreement upon which the parties
ever agreed to stipulate but it was an Order forced
upon the plaintiff at the time of the hearing on August
8, 1974 by the Court.
Plaintiff on August 8th was present with her attorney. The Court hastily made changes which were not
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agreed upon by plaintiff. Later plaintiff's attorney called
to the Court's attention an obvious mistake in his calculations of the amount of delinquency due under the
former Order (Tr. 76). This was totally ignored, although Judge Swan at the hearing on April 29, 1974
stated that until there was a modification of the previous Order the amount would stand and defendant had
a duty to comply with the Order. Notwithstanding the
Court in its amended Order and Decree relieved defendant of approximately $1,000 due and owing under the
original decree. Therefore there was no mutual agreement of the parties to which plaintiff at any time stipulated. A stipulation has been defined as an agreement,
admission or concession made in a judicial proceeding
made by the parties or their attorneys. 50 Am. Jur. 609,
par. 8:
"As a general rule, stipulations should receive
a fair and liberal construction, in harmony with
the apparent intention of the parties and the spirit
of justice, and in the furtherance of fair trials
upon the merits, rather than a narrow and technical one calculated to defeat the purposes of
their execution. The terms of a stipulation should
not, however, be so construed as to extend beyond
that which a fair construction justifies. In all cases
of doubt, that construction should be adopted
which is favorable to the party in whose favor it
is made. A stipulation must be construed in the
light of the circumstances surrounding the parties
and in view of the result which they were attempting to accomplish. In seeking the intent of the
parties the language used will not be so construed
as to give it the effect of an admission of fact
obviously intended to be controverted, or the
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waiver of a right not plainly intended to be relinquished."
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Court was
without jurisdiction to set aside the Decree of Divorce;
that the title to the real propery had become vested in
the plaintiff; that the Court's reducing the amount of
alimony and support money when the evidence actually
showed an increase in the defendant's earnings and
without any other showing was arbitrary and capricious.
We submit that plaintiff is entitled to an Order
from ths Court, vacating and setting aside the Amended
Decree of Divorce and reinstating the Decree of Divorce
with its original provisions as of November 20, 1973.
Respectfully submitted,
LA MAR DUNCAN
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
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